The Paquete Habana – Case Brief 175 U.S. 677
Keyed to Damrosch 5th
Status: Supreme Court of the United States, 1900
Facts: Two fishing vessels that were fishing out of Havana, Cuba, sailed under a Spanish flag were fishing off the Cuba coast. They were owned a Spanish subject that was born in Cuba and living in Havana. The vessels were commanded by a subject of Spain, also residing in Havana. Their cargo consisted of fresh fish, caught by their crew. The fish were kept alive to be sold alive. Until stopped by the blockading squadron they had no knowledge of the existence of the war or of any blockade. She had no arms or ammunition on board, and made no attempt to run the blockade after she knew of its existence, nor any resistance at the time of the capture.
Procedural History: DC for the Southern District of Florida condemned the two fishing vessels and their cargos as prizes of war.
Issues: Whether a court may look to established rules of other nations when their own nation lacks any treaty, legislation, proclamation, or instruction that is on point for a particular matter?
Analysis: By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.
In 1403 and 1406 Henry IV ordered that fisherman of foreign nations become under his special protection so that the fisherman in the course of their duty would not be hindered, interfered, or molested by any of his subjects.
The doctrine which exempts coast fishermen, with their vessels and cargoes, from capture as prize of war, has been familiar to the United States from the time of the War of Independence.
On June 5, 1779, Louis XVI., our ally in that war, addressed a letter to his admiral, informing him that the wish he had always had of alleviating, as far as he could, the hardships of war, had directed his attention to that class of his subjects which devoted itself to the trade of fishing, and had no other means of livelihood; that he had thought that the example which he should give to his enemies, would determine them to allow to fishermen the same facilities which he should consent to grant; and that he had therefore given orders to the commanders of all his ships not to disturb English fishermen, nor to arrest their vessels laden with fresh fish, provided they had no offensive arms, and were not proved to have made any signals creating a suspicion of intelligence with the enemy; and the admiral was directed to communicate the King’s intentions to all officers under his control.
Among the standing orders made by Sir James Marriott, Judge of the English High Court of Admiralty, was one of April 11, 1780, by which it was ‘ordered that all causes of prize of fishing boats or vessels taken from the enemy may be consolidated in one monition, and one sentence or interlocutory, if under 50 tons burthen, and not more than 6 in number.’ But by the statements of his successor, and of both French and English writers, it apears that England, as well as France, during the American Revolutionary War, abstained from interfering with the coast fisheries.
In the treaty of 1785 between the United States and Prussia, provided that, if war should arise between the contracting parties, ‘all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and in general all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy, into whose power, by the events of war, they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.’ Here was the clearest exemption from hostile molestation or seizure of the persons, occupations, houses, and goods of unarmed fishermen inhabiting unfortified places.
Wheaton’s International Laws, says: ‘In many treaties and decrees, fishermen catching fish as an article of food are added to the class of persons whose occupation is not to be disturbed in war.’
The English government, soon afterwards, more than once unqualifiedly prohibited the molestation of fishing vessels employed in catching and bringing to market fresh fish. On May 23, 1806, it was ‘ordered in council that all fishing vessels under Prussian and other colors, and engaged for the purpose of catching fish and conveying them fresh to market, with their crews, cargoes, and stores, shall not be molested on their fishing voyages and bringing the same to market.
In the war with Mexico, in 1846, the United States recognized the exemption of coast fishing boats from capture. It appears that Commodore Conner, commanding the Home Squadron blockading the east coast of Mexico, on May 14, 1846, wrote a letter to Mr. Bancroft, the Secretary of the Navy, inclosing a copy of the commodore’s ‘instructions to the commanders of the vessels of the Home Squadron, showing the principles to be observed in the blockade of the Mexican ports,’ one of which was that ‘Mexican boats engaged in fishing on any part of the coast will be allowed to pursue their labors unmolested;’ and that on June 10, 1846, those instructions were approved by the Navy Department.
In the treaty of peace between the United States and Mexico, in 1848, were inserted the very words of the earlier treaties with Prussia, already quoted, forbidding the hostile molestation or seizure in time of war of the persons, occupations, houses, or goods of fishermen.
France in the Crimean war in 1854, and in her wars with Italy in 1859 and with Germany in 1870, by general orders, forbade her cruisers to trouble the coast fisheries, or to seize any vessel or boat engaged therein, unless naval or military operations should make it necessary.
Since the English orders in council of 1806 and 1810, before quoted, in favor of fishing vessels employed in catching and bringing to market fresh fish, no instance has been found in which the exemption from capture of private coast fishing vessels honestly pursuing their peaceful industry has been denied by England or by any other nation. And the Empire of Japan by an ordinance promulgated at the beginning of its war with China in August, 1894, established prize courts, and ordained that ‘the following enemy’s vessels are exempt from detention,’ including in the exemption ‘boats engaged in coast fisheries,’ as well as ‘ships engaged exclusively on a voyage of scientific discovery, philanthrophy, or religious mission.’
Wheaton observes: ‘Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers, or to substitute, in any case, their authority for the principles of reason, it may be affirmed that they are generally impartial in their judgment. They are witnesses of the sentiments and usages of civilized nations, and the weight of their testimony increases every time that their authority is invoked by statesmen, and every year that passes without the rules laid down in their works being impugned by the avowal of contrary principles.’
Chancellor Kent says: ‘In the absence of higher and more authoritative sanctions, the ordinances of foreign states, the opinions of eminent statesmen, and the writings of distinguished jurists, are regarded as of great consideration on questions not settled by conventional law. In cases where the principal jurists agree, the presumption will be very great in favor of the solidity of their maxims; and no civilized nation that does not arrogantly set all ordinary law and justice at defiance will venture to disregard the uniform sense of the established writers on international law.’
This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.
This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter.
Holding: Yes
Judgment: Ordered, that the decree of the District Court be reversed, and the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale of her cargo, be restored to the claimant, with damages and costs.
Rule: A court may look to established rules of other nations when their own nation lacks any treaty, legislation, proclamation, or instruction that is on point for a particular matter.
Where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.
Dissent or Concurrence: Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting:
The district court held these vessels and their cargoes liable because not ‘satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance, treaty, or proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from seizure. This court holds otherwise, not because such exemption is to be found in any treaty, legislation, proclamation, or instruction granting it, but on the ground that the vessels were exempt by reason of an established rule of international law applicable to them, which it is the duty of the court to enforce.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits)Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports, 1960, p. 6
21. Portugal claimed before the International Court that she had a right of passage through intervening Indian territory to the extent necessary for the exercise of her sovereignty over two small enclaves and that India had refused to recognize the obligations imposed by this right.
22. In support of her claim Portugal relied in part on certain agreements concluded in the 18th century between Portugal and the local Maratha ruler. Although the Court found that the agreements concerned amounted only to a revenue grant, and not to a grant of sovereignty together with a right of passage, it appears to have assumed that any such rights granted would have been binding on successor States.16
The Court found, however, that:
” . . . the situation underwent a change with the advent of the British as sovereign of that part of the country in place of the Marathas. The British found the Portuguese in occupation of the villages and exercising full and exclusive administrative authority over them. They accepted the situation as they found it and left the Portuguese in occupation of and in exercise of exclusive authority over, the villages.
The Portuguese held themselves out as sovereign over the villages. The British did not, as successors of the Marathas, themselves claim sovereignty, nor did they accord express recognition of Portuguese sovereignty, over them. The exclusive authority of the Portuguese over the villages was never brought in question. Thus Portuguese sovereignty over the villages was recognized by the British in fact and by implication and-was subsequently recognized by India. As a consequence the villages comprised in the Maratha grant acquired the character of Portuguese enclaves within Indian territory.”17
23. Concerning the right of passage, the Court reached the conclusion that:
” . . . with regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general there existed during the British and post-British periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage between Daman and the enclaves. This practice having continued over a period extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime in respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India became independent, the Court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied that that practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation/’18
In the case of armed forces and armed police, the Court found that their passage had been dependent on the discretionary power of the territorial sovereign and that no right of passage as such existed in favour of Portugal.
“The course of dealings established between the Portuguese and the British authorities with respect to the passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such right. The practice that was established shows that, with regard to these categories, it was well understood that passage could take place only by permission of the British authorities. This
situation continued during the post-British period.”19
24. The Court held that India had not acted contrary to its obligations regarding the passage of private persons, since such passage was subject at all times to India’s power of regulation and control. the Permanent Court of International Justice held that obligations in the nature of real rights had been created, which attached to the District of St. Gingolph and remained binding upon the successor State after sovereignty had passed from Sardinia to France.
[International Law] Asylum Case: Columbia v Peru 1950 ICJ Rep. 266 Case Summary.
Facts Victor Raul Haya de la Torre was a Peruvian national. In Oct 3rd, 1948 one military rebellion broke out in Peru which is organized and directed by the American People’s Revolutionary Alliance led by Haya de la Torre. The rebellion was unsuccessful. The Peruvian Government issued a warrant for his arrest on criminal charges related to this political uprising. He fled to the Columbian embassy in Lima seeking for asylum from them. Columbia the requested permission from Peru for Haya de la Torre’s safe passage from the Columbian embassy, through Peru, goes to Columbia. Peru refused to give such permission. Columbia then brought this suit against Peru in the International Court of Justice, based on the agreement made by both named Act of Lima. These are the submissions made by the two parties: 1) The Columbian had pleaded for the court to declare that Columbia had properly granted asylum based on 2 submissions:- a. They are competent to qualify the offence for the purpose of the said asylum. b. That Peru is bound to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of the Haya de la Torre, from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person. 2) Counter-claim by Peru is that for the court to declare that the grant of asylum made by the Columbian Ambassador to Haya de la Torre was made in violation of the Convention on Asylum. Argument Plaintiff (Columbian) arguments based on the Convention in force which are the Bolivarian Agreement 1911 on Extradition, the Havana Convention 1928 on Asylum, the Montevideo Convention 1933 on Political Asylum and American International Law. The Defendant (Peru) counter-claim relied on the rules of Havana Convention first, Haya de la Torre was accused, not a political offense but of a common crime and second, because the urgency which was required under the Havana Convention in order to justify asylum was absent in that case. Issue 1. Whether or not Columbia is competent in granting asylum to qualify the offence as based on conventions, which in force between both countries, and in general from American international law. 2. Whether or not Peru is bound to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of the refugees from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person? Decision 1) Columbia was not competent to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision binding on Peru. 2) Columbia was not entitled to claim that the Peru was bound to gives guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la Torre, with due regard to the inviolability of his person. 3) Peru counter-claim that Haya de la Torre was an accused of a common crime was rejected. Therefore it was not in accordance with Article I, Paragraph I of the Havana convention. 4) Peru Counter-claim that the grant of asylum by the Columbian government to Haya de la Torre Torre was made in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Havana Convention was approved by the court. Ratio Decidendi 1) The court reject the Columbian argument based on Bolivarian Agreement on the reason that the principle of International Law did not recognize any rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by the state granting diplomatic asylum. On the other hand, the Bolivarian Agreement laid down rules on extradition and it was not possible to deduce from them conclusions concerning diplomatic asylum as it was different in the meaning. The court also rejected the Havana Convention invoke by the Columbian as the convention did not recognize the right of unilateral qualification. And the third convention, Convention of Montevideo, had not been ratified by Peru and could not be invoked against it. As for the American international law, Columbia had failed to prove that it had constant and uniform practice of unilateral qualification as a right of the State of refuge and an obligation upon the territorial state. The fact submitted to the court disclosed too much contradiction and fluctuation, shows that therein a usage peculiar to Latin America and accepted as law. 2) The court also rejected the Columbian claim based on Havana Convention that the Peru was bound to gives guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la Torre, on the reason that the convention only applicable if the territorial State demanded the departure of the refugee from its territory. It was only after such demand that the diplomatic Agent who granted asylum could require safe-conduct. 3) Peru counter-claim that Haya de la Torre was an accused of a common crime was rejected on the reason that the refugee was charged for military rebellion, which was not a common crime as needed under the Havana Convention. 4) The court came into conclusion on Peru Counter-claim that the grant of asylum by the Columbian government to Haya de la Torre Torre was made in violation of Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Havana Convention was on the reason that the absent of element of urgency needed to justify the asylum, in order to protect the person from danger. In this case the danger that only faced by Haya de la Torre is legal preceding that will be imposed on him, not a deprivation of his right. The Havana Convention according to the court was not intended to protect a citizen who had plotted against the institutions of his country from regular legal proceedings. Asylum could only intervene against the action of justice in cases where arbitrary action was substituted for the rule of law. Rationale 1) Before a convention can be accepted to be used as the law under Article 38 of Statute of International Court of Justice, it must be ratified by the contesting state. – This has been shown by the reluctance of the court to used certain provision in the convention as had not been ratified by the party country. – Ie: see rules on Montevideo Convention. 2) The principle of International Law that are not recognizing the rules of unilateral treaty. 3) This decision also shows us that in order for the custom to be international custom it must be a general practice. – Ie: see rules on American International Law
The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway)
The Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) was the culmination of a dispute, originating in 1933, over how large an area of water surrounding Norway was Norwegian waters (that Norway thus had exclusive fishing rights to) and how much was ‘high seas’ (that the UK could thus fish).
On 24 September 1949, the UK requested that the International Court of Justice determine how far Norway’s territorial claim extended to sea, and to award the UK damages in compensation for Norwegian interference with UK fishing vessels in the disputed waters, claiming that Norway’s claim to such an extent of waters was against international law.
On 18 December 1951, the ICJ decided that Norway’s claims to the waters were not inconsistent with international laws concerning the ownership of local sea-space.
I. Case of the S.S. Wimbledon (PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 1, 1923)
II. Facts
A. The British, French, Italian, and Japanese Governments filed an application with the registry of the court (PCIJ) on January 16, 1923 against the German Government for refusing a steamship right of passage. The PCIJ heard and decided the case on August 17, 1923.
B. On March 21, 1921, the German government refused to let the English steamship Wimbledon (chartered by a French company “Les Affreteurs Reunis”) pass through the Kiel Canal. The ship picked up 4,200 tons of
ammunition and artillery stores in Salonica, Greece, to be brought to the Polish Naval Base at Danzig, but when the ship arrived at the entrance to the Kiel Canal it was refused passage because of the German neutrality order in accordance with the Russo-Polish war. The French Ambassador in Berlin asked the Germans to allow the S.S. Wimbledon passage, and several days later the German Government responded that it couldn’t allow the vessel to pass because of the military cargo that it carried. The French company then told the ship to go to Danzig via the Danish Straits, resulting in the cargo arriving thirteen days late- eleven for detainment by the Germans and two for the extra time it took to go the alternate route. Diplomatic relations between the states did not end in a resolution, so the matter was then brought before the League of Nations and thus the Permanent Court of International Justice to hear the case.
C. The plaintiffs in this case are the British, French, Japanese, and Italian governments who claim that Germany violated Articles 380 to 386 of the Treaty of Versailles, which, among other things, states that the Kiel Canal will remain “free and open to the vessels of commerce of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.” The plaintiffs argue that despite the cargo on the ship, the nation chartering the ship was not at war with Germany and thus should have been allowed passage.
D. The defendant in this case is the government of Germany who claims that despite the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, they were under no obligation to allow the passage of the S.S. Wimbledon because they issued a Neutrality Order for the Russo-Polish War, which would be broken by allowing weapons
to be shipped to Poland.
III. Questions
A. Is a state allowed to refuse free passage to a vessel of another state based on the cargo that it is holding if there is a treaty demanding free passage, but another order stating neutrality from military conflict?
B. Can a state be obligated to allow free passage, even if this denies the state its right to neutrality in times of war?
IV. Decision
The Court ruled that Germany had no right to refuse entrance to the S.S. Wimbledon on behalf of the cargo that it was carrying. In addition, the Court claimed that the Kiel Canal is no longer in the same category as normal internal waterways that are ruled at the discretion of the state they are housed in, but rather it should be considered an international waterway as laid out in the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the Kiel Canal
should be open to all vessels, regardless of state, as long as that state is at peace with Germany, because the point of the canal is to provide easier access to the Baltic. Since the Treaty of Versailles specifically said that the canal could deny access to states at war with Germany, it obviously was not a mistake that it did not include the closure of the canal if Germany was neutral in a war between two other states. Also, the intent of the writes of the Treaty of Versailles was to have the canal be an international waterway to the Baltic. In addition, the Court cited precedent from the Suez and Panama Canals as illustrations to the invalidity of Germany’s claim. Finally, the Court dismissed Germany’s claim that their Neutrality Order superseded the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.
V. Principles
A. A key international law issue in this case is that a neutrality order issued by an individual state cannot hold more power than the provisions of an international treaty of peace.
B. This case asserts that the right of passage in internal waterways can become designated as not being considered internal waterways, and thus the state has limited rights over its control, whereas the international community has a much greater say.
C. If a state’s vessel is denied access to a waterway, it affects the commerce and rights of all states who may have vested interests in the area, and thus these states have the jurisdiction to bring a case against the state who is restricting the rights of free passage.
VI. Conclusion
The importance of this case lies in that it shows that despite a state having a waterway within its boundaries, it does not always have ultimate control over the right of passage of other states’ vessels. This case put a limit on some state sovereignty and gave more power to international law in that it affirmed that international peace treaties hold more weight than individual Neutrality Orders of specific states. This decision showed that the PCIJ considered the Treaty of Versailles to be binding and not open to interpretation by individual states that signed the treaty.
Individuals as objects of Int’l LawCase: The Barcelona Traction Case (1970; ICJ)
Facts: Barcelona Traction was a corporation that controlled light and powerutilities in Spain and was incorporated in Toronto, (Canada). In 1948, there wasan adjudication in bankruptcy in Spain of Barcelona Traction. Its object was toseek reparation for damage alleged by Belgium to have been sustained by Belgiannationals, shareholders in the company. The Belgian Government, contended thatafter the First World War Barcelona Traction share capital came to be very largelyheld by alleged Belgian nationals, but the Spanish Government, maintained that theBelgian nationality of the shareholders was not proven.Issue: Whether Belgium can bring this case in the ICJ. – No.Holding: Belgium’s claim is rejected.Reasoning: The Belgian government lacked the standing to exercise diplomaticprotection of Belgian shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to measurestaken against that company in Spain. The court ruled on the side of the Spanish,holding that only the nationality of the corporation (the Canadians) can sue.The case is important as it demonstrates how the concept of diplomatic protectionunder international law can apply equally to corporations as to individuals.Notes• Facts:Incorporated in Canada, Belgians hold majority of shares
○Belgian gov’t say they own the shares
○Business bankrupted in Spain
○Issue settled without Belgians involved, and Belgian gov’t seeks
○ reparation• The connection of the company with Belgium very strong, but court still decidedthat Belgium gov’t cannot submit claims on behalf of its citizens.
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia & New Zealand v. France)
Procedural History: Proceeding before the International Court of Justice.
Overview: Australia and New Zealand (P) demanded that France (D) cease atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France (D) completed a series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand (P) applied to the !.C.). demanding that France (D) cease testing immediately. While the case was pending, France (D) announced the series of tests was complete and that it did not plan any further such tests. France (D) moved to dismiss the applications.
Issue: May declarations made by way of unilateral acts have the effect of creating legal obligations?
Rule: declerations made by way of unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations.
Analysis: The unilateral statements made by French authorities were first communicated to the government of Australia. To have legal effect there was no need tor the statements to be directed to any particular state. The general nature and characteristics of the statements alone were relevant for evaluation of their legal implications.
Outcome: Yes. Declarations made by way of unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations. The sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any given declaration reveals a clear intention. One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations is the principle of good faith. The statements made by the President of the French Republic must be held to constitute an engagement of the State in regard to the circumstances and intention with which they were made. The statements made by the French authorities are therefore relevant and legally binding. Applications dismissed.
Mijares v. Ranada
Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, §7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
Held:
Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. §33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. §16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for
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enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of §7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is §7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”
Esquire 